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Martel v. HG Staffing, LLC, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 56 (Sept. 08, 2022)1
CIVIL EMPLOYMENT ACTION: NEVADA EMPLOYEES CANNOT BRING TIME
BARRED CLAIMS FOR UNPAID WAGES AGAINST PREVIOUS EMPLOYER WITH
WHOM THEY HAD A VALID COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and judgment against
claims made by a class of employees against their previous employer, HG Staffing, LLC. The
Court made four major findings. First, the two-year limitations period applies to wage claims
arising under NRS 608.016, NRS 608.018, NRS 680.020, and NRS 680.050. Second, a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) need not be signed by the parties or unexpired; mutual assent is
enough to validate the agreement. Third, if claims for wages are already time barred, employees
cannot try to penalize the employer under NRS 608.040. Finally, if an active CBA contains a
provision addressing overtime pay, employees cannot enjoy the overtime benefits provided for
waged employees in the Nevada Revised Statutes.
Background
Appellants Eddy Martel, Mary Anne Capilla, Janice Jackson-Williams, and Whitney
Vaughan worked at the Grand Sierra Resort (GSR), which is a hotel in Reno managed by HG
Staffing, LLC. Their general claim alleges that GSR failed to pay them for activities such as
attending meetings or classes, putting on uniforms, and reconciling cash amounts. The
employees ceased their work at GSR on the following dates: June 2013 (Vaughan), September
2013 (Capilla), June 2014 (Martel), and December 2015 (Jackson-Williams).
As employees of GSR, appellants are members of the Culinary Workers Union Local
226, which controls the CBA. The CBA, originally formed between the Union and previous
owners of GSR, passed its expiration date, lacks a signature from HG Staffing, and contains
redline edits. Still, the record indicates the Union assented to and ratified the agreement. The
CBA contains, in relevant part, provisions outlining the pay structure for overtime hours.
The four employees filed a putative class action in the Second Judicial District Court in
2016. They alleged injury from GSR’s failure to pay for hours worked in violation of the
following: “(1) NRS 608.016 (requiring an employer to pay wages for each hour worked); (2) the
Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) of Nevada's Constitution, Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16
(requiring employers to pay employees a minimum hourly wage); (3) NRS 608.018 (requiring an
employer to pay overtime wages); and (4) NRS 608.020 through NRS 608.050 (requiring an
employer to timely pay a former employee their earned wages).” Appellant Jackson-Williams
added some induvial claims under the NRS 608.040 (penalty for failure to pay discharged or
quitting employee) and NRS 608.140 (request for attorney’s fees). The district court partially
granted appellees’ motion to dismiss certain time barred claims, and ultimately granted HG
Staffing’s motion for summary judgment against the remainder of the employees’ claims.
Appellants brought this appeal to overturn the district court’s rulings.
Discussion
The main issue before the court is whether the class of employees made valid claims for
unpaid wages under various Nevada Statutes.
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The district court did not err by granting in part HG Staffing’s motion to dismiss
To dismiss a claim under NRCP 12(b)(5) facts alleged are assumed true and inferences
must be drawn in favor of the complainant.2 Furthermore, the reviewing court determines whether
claims are time barred by the statute of limitations, so long as facts in the case are not in dispute. 3
A two-year limitations period applies to the Martel employees’ claims arising under
NRS Chapter 608
Appellants argue that the three-year limitations period laid out in NRS 11.190(3)(a)
applies here since their claim is statutorily created. On the other hand, appellees posit that the
two-year limitations period from NRS 608.260 applies because appellants’ claims are concerned
with statutory minimum wages. The Court agrees with appellees and applies the two-year
limitations period using the doctrine of analogous limitations. This doctrine allows courts to
apply the limitations period from an analogous cause of action or statute when the original claim
lacks an express limitations period.4 Thus, the court applies the two-year period here because
NRS 608.260 provides a cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, and appellants claim they
were not paid for certain activities, which, by implication, means they were not paid the
minimum wage for those activities.
Since Capilla and Vaughan each left GSR more than two years before the claim was
brought, they were time barred by NRS 608.260. Martel and Jackson-Williams had one day and
eighteen months of remaining claims within the limitations period, respectively.
Summary judgment was appropriate
When pleadings and other docket materials display no genuine issue of material fact, then
a party moving for summary judgment is entitled a judgment as a matter of law.5 Moreover,
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.6
The CBA is valid because it was ratified by the Culinary Union
The Court recognizes that CBAs are not governed by the technical rules of contract
formation.7 To that end, HG Staffing never signing the CBA and the document’s extensive
redlining and expiration are irrelevant. The only pertinent fact is the Culinary Union and HG
Staffing’s mutual assent to the agreement. Accordingly, the CBA is valid because the
organization ratified and used the provisions of the agreement.
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HG Staffing is entitled to summary judgment on Martel’s claims arising under NRS
608.020 through NRS 608.050
Appellant Martel argues his claims arising under NRS 608.020 (employer penalty for
unpaid hourly wages) and NRS 608.050 (employer penalty for unpaid overtime wages) are not
time barred. To support this proposition, he cites NRS 608.040 which includes a provision
stating that an employee is entitled to compensation up to 30 days after his resignation if the
employer failed to pay his final wages.8 In doing so, he asserts that hours he completed under
NRS 608.016 (hourly waged work) and NRS 608.018 (overtime work) were not paid once his
wages were due in June 2014.
The Court does not accept this analysis. Since the claims arising under NRS 608.016 and
NRS 608.018 were already barred under the two-year limitations period under NRS 608.260,
appellant Martel’s argument falls apart. Consequently, the Court finds no genuine dispute of
material fact regarding Martel’s remaining claims, and, therefore, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment for HG Staffing.
The CBA “provides otherwise” for overtime under NRS 608.018
Since she had eighteen months of work that were not time barred, Appellant JacksonWilliams asserted that her claim for overtime under NRS 608.018 was still valid. However, as
the Court pointed out, employees will collect to overtime pay under that section only if they are
not already subject to a CBA which provides otherwise for overtime compensation.9
The valid CBA between the Union and HG Staffing provided an overtime pay structure
and applied to Jackson-Williams. Therefore, she cannot enjoy the overtime benefits provided for
in NRS 608.018. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the district court
was correct to grant appellee’s summary judgment motion.
HG Staffing is entitled to summary judgment on Jackson-Williams’s remaining claims
Appellant Jackson-Williams’s asserted her remaining claims under NRS 608.040 and
NRS 608.140. On appeal, she failed to cite caselaw or portions of the record which display a
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on these claims. Notably, the Court
is not obligated to search the record for disputed facts that would help the appellant.10 As a
result, they found nothing precluding the district court from granting summary judgment in favor
of HG Staffing.
Conclusion
In this case, the Court made four major findings. First, the class of employees could not
bring claims under NRS 608.016, NRS 608.018, NRS 680.020, and NRS 680.050 because they
were time barred by the two-year limitations period found in NRS 608.260 through the doctrine
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of analogous limitations. Second, the CBA between the Culinary Union and HG Staffing was
valid based solely on the factual finding of mutual assent; the expiration, redlining, and lack of
signatures were all irrelevant. Third, the class of employees could not penalize HG Staffing for
unpaid wages under NRS 608.040 because their claims for those unpaid wages were time barred.
Finally, the former GRS employees were not entitled to claims for unpaid overtime pay under
NRS 608.018 because their CBA provided its own overtime pay scheme. By making each of
these findings, the Court affirmed the holding of the district court.

